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Recent studies have highlighted the superior performance of intra-industry spin-os over both diversifying
rms and other de novo entrants. It is often argued that superior knowledge endowments of founders are the
explanation of these ndings. However, the evidence is still very preliminary. We investigate this further using
a detailed dataset covering the entire Danish economy by introducing a proxy for knowledge accumulation
of founders, i.e. their previous employer tenure, in a study of the performance of 8,000 new rms across
various industries. We nd that both proxies signicantly inuences the performance of spin-os, which
supports that argument that knowledge accumulation could be the explanation for the superior performance
of spin-os.
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1. Introduction.
The literature on entrepreneurs with prior background in the industry that they enter, often labeled
spin-os, spin-outs or progeny, have grown tremendously in recent years (see Klepper (2001) and
Klepper and Thompson (2006) for reviews). These studies have shown how spin-os have superior
performance over other new entrants and sometimes even diversifying rms. This nding is often
explained by superior knowledge endowments of the founders (Agarwal et al. 2004). The argument
is that founders have accumulated knowledge while being employed at an incumbent rm in the
industry, which become useful for them and eventually lead to superior performance.
One of the most advanced studies of this sort is Klepper's (2007) study the U.S. automotive
industry. He nds that spin-os performed relatively better if they were based on the expertise
of the parent rms. These ndings highlight how knowledge diusion could be a key explanation
for the superior performance of spin-os as founders accumulate knowledge in incumbent rms
and base their activities on the expertise of parent rms. This could enable them to outperform
diversifying rms and other de novo entrants.
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Given that superior knowledge endowments are frequent explanations for the success of spin-os,
we still have limited evidence for the dynamics of knowledge accumulation in this relationship.
This paper makes an attempt to ll these gaps by considering the importance of founder tenure
at the parent rm on performance for a wide selection of rms in various industries over a shorter
time frame. We argue that founder tenure at the previous organization is proxy, which can be used
to evaluate the eect of knowledge accumulation, since founders with longer employment spells are
likely to generate more knowledge on the parent organization compared to founders with shorter
spells. Most of the studies of this phenomenon have been conducted on single industry data sets
covering often most of the history of the industries. This leaves the question whether these ndings
are general for the survival of new rms across various industries. We estimate the eect of these
two proxies for knowledge accumulation and inheritance on the performance of new rms using a
detailed matched employer-employee dataset covering the entire Danish economy from 1980 until
2003.
We nd that both previous employer tenure of founders have signicant and positive eect on
performance, if they become spin-os by entering the same industry as their previous employer.
This further indicates that knowledge accumulation could be a valid explanation for the superior
performance of spin-os.
2. Knowledge accumulation and tenure of founders.
Organizational sociologists (Brittain and Freeman 1986, Carroll 1984, Hannan and Freeman 1986)
argue these spin-os from existing rms represent a transfer of knowledge and resources. They
claim that blueprints from the founders previous employers are passed to the new rms through
the mobility of these founders (Phillips 2002). The type of knowledge transferred is not limited
to codied knowledge, widely available in scientic articles, strategy reports and technical spec-
ications, but also includes valuable tacit knowledge accumulated by individuals (Agarwal et al.
2004). Employees leave the parent rms carrying with them the tacit knowledge generated through
learning by doing (Arrow 1962) or learning by observing (Nonaka 1994) in the course of their
previous employment. Founders of new ventures learn about the parent organization from being
employed there. They are able to observe how the parent rms organizational capabilities and
knowledge interact and govern the evolution of those rms. The strategies and organizational forms
of new organizations are similar to those of the organizations in which their founders were formerly
employed (Aldrich and Wiedenmayer 1993).
Empirical evidence supports the parent-progeny transfer of organizational knowledge, which
leads progeny rms to follow the organizational principles of parent rms closely. Baron and HannanDahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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(2002) argue that one might expect that founders previously employed in rather bureaucratic
organizations would want to escape from such a model and to create a new rm with a radically
dierent style. However, Baron and Hannan found that entrepreneurs with this prole were actually
more likely to stick to a bureaucratic organizational template. Thus, founders are likely to base
their new ventures on an organization model that they are familiar with, rather than to adopt a
totally new and dierent model.
Founders of spin-os are likely to bring to their new rms specic tacit knowledge about a wide
range of organizational issues (Helfat and Lieberman 2002). Accordingly, more experienced founders
will have more valuable knowledge, which will increase the probability of success compared with
less experienced entrants. If this holds true, the success of new entrants will depend on the past
experience of their founders. Employees in incumbent rms are well placed to found start-ups based
on the knowledge acquired at and developed by the incumbent. Furthermore, this argumentation
also means that when prospective founders of new rms leave a parent rm, the initial knowledge
endowment will be highly inuenced by the parents knowledge at the time of separation (Agarwal
et al. 2004). This is likely to have long-term eects on the new rms performance, since the
founding condition greatly inuences the structure, culture, strategy and routines of the start-up
(Stinchcombe 1965).
Founders have dierent stocks of knowledge and accumulated experience, which implies that they
dier in terms of their ability to recognize and follow up new opportunities. Prior knowledge and
experience endow them with a greater ability to facilitate the acquisition of information on mar-
ket development, technological change and production processes (Shane 2003). This, in turn, will
increase the ability to found a successful start-up. Hence, the knowledge acquired at a parent rm,
which will include knowledge about how to exploit new knowledge and technological developments
in the particular industry (Cooper 1985, Roberts 1991), may prove crucial for a start-up. However,
the benet derives not only from knowledge about the technological development of the product
in question, but also from knowledge about markets and, perhaps more importantly, knowledge of
how to serve these markets (Shane 2000). This can be related to supplier relationships, sales tech-
niques or other market information. Similarly, knowledge about how to serve markets will increase
the ability to identify opportunities, because it will improve understanding of the production and
marketing gains associated with a new product. A founder with experience in the industry with
respect to this process is more likely to be able to exploit such opportunities, and the new start-up
is more likely to be founded on the basis of experiences and organizational routines that haveDahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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proven successful in the past. Starting with a good model will positively aect the long-term per-
formance of a rm (Cyert and March 1963), since it is dicult to change the initial blueprints.
The combination of a good model and superior knowledge endowment from employment in a good
parent rm, will produce a higher performing spin-o.
In summary, it is generally accepted that founders' initial knowledge endowments are crucial for
the fate of their new ventures. In addition, founders are widely argued to accumulate knowledge
at the previous employers, which add to their knowledge endowment. Accumulated knowledge
from the parent organization can be particularly useful, when entering the same industry as an
entrepreneur. We extend this theory by arguing that the length of tenure of founders with the
parent rms is key to superior performance in the spin-os that have been studied.
Founders acquire tacit knowledge from their parent rms, which they bring to their new rms.
However, the duration of employment in parent rms will dier and this almost inevitably will
inuence the degree of knowledge absorption of the founders. If founders have been employed for
a relatively longer time in the parent organizations, the amount of knowledge they will embody
is likely to be much higher than in founders with shorter tenure. Founders with longer tenure will
have a better view of the organization and broader knowledge about it. Their perceptions of the
organizational competence governing the parent rm will be sharper and more complete which will
help them to replicate the successes and learn from the failures of the parent rms in their new
ventures. Their knowledge endowment will simply be superior to that of other founders with less
or no experience or with shorter employment spells. This is likely to increase the probability that
these new ventures will survive. Accordingly, we conjecture that relatively longer tenure in the
parent rms increases the survival chances of the spin-os.
We argue that the duration of employment is important, but also the level of employment will
have a major inuence. If founders have been previously employed part of a top management
team, they will likely have been able to get a more extensive view of the organization compared to
less senior employees. Klepper and Thompson (2006) argue that the degree to which the founders
are able to succeed with their new ventures depends on the founders inuence on the decision
making process at the parent rm. Knowledge is more accessible at the higher occupational levels.
Accordingly, founders who previously held high-level positions are likely to found better performing
spin-os, because of their superior access to knowledge about the rm.
This extension of the theory implies that there are dierent strengths of inherited knowledge.
Along with many other scholars, we have argued that the survival chances of spin-os are likely to
be higher than those of other start-ups. Here we conjecture that among spin-os, those foundedDahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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by entrepreneurs with relatively longer tenure at their parent rms will be better performing as a
result of a superior knowledge endowment and more complete knowledge about the organizational
routines of the parent rm.
One could easily imagine several competing theories for this claims. The parent tenure issue
could be especially interesting in this respect. We argue that it is better to stay in one rm for
a long time compared to multiple short stays in dierent rms even in the same industry. It is a
question whether it is better have one reference employer that founders have a deep understanding
of or have more reference employers that you know less about. We will try to control for as many
of these as possible within our data.
3. Empirical strategy.
Our theoretical arguments use broad concepts like knowledge accumulation and performance while
our hypothesis is more specic. We want elaborate further on this in order to bridge theory with
empirical analysis. We argue that the performance of spin-os will be higher, if the founders have
been employed at the previous employer for relatively longer time. In the present paper, we focus
on survival as the main indicator of performance. It is specically relevant, since a large number
of new rms do not survive for a long period of time. Evidence show that 40 per cent of new rms
fail within the rst year (Taylor 1999), and more than 60 per cent surviving less than ve years
(Kirchho 1994). This indicates that survival is a particularly interesting performance measure
for studies of new rms. Consequently, we focus our analysis on explaining the fate of new rms
explained by variables on tenure as proxies for the accumulation of knowledge by founders.
3.1. Data and measures.
We analyze data from government registers controlled by Statistics Denmark in the Integrated
Database for Labor Market Research, known as the IDA database. This dataset contains combined
information on every person, plant and rm in the Danish economy from 1980 to 2003 gathered
from the ocial registers of the Danish government, which, because of its extensive welfare policies,
records extremely detailed information about Denmarks economic activity.
In addition, we rely on the Entrepreneurship Database from Statistics Denmark to access infor-
mation on the founders of new rms in Denmark. In our sample, this database covers all new
companies founded from 1995-2001. Statistics Denmark compiles this list of founders based on
information on the boards, registrants, management, occupation areas, and wages of all people
involved in the founding of each new registered company. Their procedure however only allows
for the identication of one main founder per rm. We link these founders to the IDA databaseDahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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to obtain historical information on the founders. This enables us to trace the background of the
founders back to 1980 and follow the fate of their new rms until 2003.
Our sample consists of 7,968 new rms founded from 1995 to 2001. These are founded in the
private sector, excluding the primary and public sectors. We focus on the industries classied from
15 to 75 (food processing to business sciences, both included) in the European NACE system's two
digit level, but have excluded new rms in the 40 to 45 (recycling) interval, which is a mix of public
and private rms. The eects of tenure are likely be very dierent for serial entrepreneurs, so we
focus our analysis on the sample of rst time entrepreneurs. We match this sample of new rms
with the IDA data and trace the background of founders back to 1980. We restrict our sample to
new rms with at least one employee in the rst year.
Founder experiences. The majority of literature on spin-os focus on intra-industry spin-os
as the denition of spin-os.1 Here we dene spin-os as rms founded in the same industry as a
the founder was previously employed. This is used as a dummy and an interacting eect on relevant
explanatory variables in our analysis. We create a continuous variable measuring the previous
employer tenure. Based on our matching of the census data from 1980 to 2003 with the list of
founders from 1995 to 2001, we calculate the previous employer tenure as the founder's length of
employment at the previous employer. Accordingly, this is based on the number of years in which
we have information about the respective founder. If the founder were employed at the previous
employer only in the year before becoming an entrepreneur, tenure is zero. It starts counting, if
the founder were employed for two years or more.
Our theory is that new rms are inuences by the previous employer besides what we can label as
industry features. We want to control for industry in order to isolate the previous employer tenure
eect. Consequently, we calculate a measure for industry tenure based on the same procedure. We
also want to control for competing theories related to long tenure from a single organization or
shorter tenure from several organizations. Thus, we add a measure for the log number of rms in
the industry in which the founder previously have been employed.
Controls. We include the size of the past employer measured by the number of employees in
the year of the spin-o event. Second, we include the parent rm age in the estimations. We use
the logged versions of these variables. Since parent rm age is left censored, we add a dummy
for the parent rms that 15 years or older. Controlling for parent rm size is in line with the
ndings of Srensen and Phillips (2004) that self-employed individuals coming from small previous
1 An exception is Eriksson and Kuhn (2006) performed on the Danish census data alone, without the list of founders.Dahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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employers were more likely to survive and perform well nancially than individuals coming from
larger organizations. We expect to replicate this result.
We included a number of variables that have been used in analyses of rm survival in industrial
organization (e.g. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) and Audretsch and Mahmood (1995)) and
organization ecology (e.g. Br uderl and Sch ussler (1990) and Br uderl et al. (1992)). This should
insure that we are not picking up noise from omitted variables, which traditionally are important in
survival studies. Most importantly, we want to insure that any nding on the above variables is not
associated with the start-up size of the new rms. According, we include the logarithm of the initial
size of the new start-up. This is the number of employees in the rst year of business. Second, we
include two variables to control for the founder's level of education. High level is lengthy education,
equivalent to a ve-year university education or higher. This includes all university masters and
doctoral programs. Medium level is education equivalent to university bachelors programs (three
years), or similar lengths and levels of education from other types of education institutions. Lower
levels are omitted as a benchmark. Third, we control for the age of the founder to isolate general
life experience eects. Br uderl and Sch ussler (1990) and Eriksson and Kuhn (2006) controlled for
this in a similar or precisely the same way. Fourth, we add a dummy for the immigrants and
descendants of immigrants to add a control for the founders coming from abroad, which typically
have lower windows of tenure from Danish labor market. Finally, we include seven non-reported
industry dummies (one digit NACE level) to control for possible industry dierences and 33 non-
reported region dummies for the labor market regions of Denmark. Table 1 presents the descriptive
statistics.
4. Results.
Our data are discrete yearly observations gathered in the third week of November each year. We
cannot identify the specic time of year when a start-up is founded or exits, but only whether or
not it exists in the third week of November in the respective year. This means that survival occurs
in continuous time, but spell lengths are observed only in intervals. Cox hazard models (Cox 1972,
Cox and Oakes 1984) are typically used in these types of studies although they assume continues
time data. There are several other methods available for estimation of hazard rates with discrete
time data. We present logit estimations on rm-year data, where the dependent variable is zero
in all, but the observation were the rm goes out of business.2 These estimations are presented in
Table 2.
2 Earlier studies (Agarwal et al. 2002, Baum and Oliver 1991, Henderson 1999) have experimented with complementary
log-log, logit and probit estimations as a proper alternative to Cox hazard models. To ensure that our results are
robust, we also estimated complementary log-log and probit models on rm-year observations (unreported). These
ndings are robust and identical to the estimations in Table 2.Dahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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Table 1 Descriptives
Variable Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Age (1 year) .210 .407 0 1
Age (2 years) .171 .376 0 1
Age (3-4 years) .242 .428 0 1
Age (5-9 years) .168 .374 0 1
Ln (initial size) .898 .825 0 4.419
Limited liability .512 .500 0 1
Male .778 .416 -0.014 1
Labor market experiences (years) 13.756 8.058 0 37
Labor market experiences (years)
2 254.174 261.651 0 1369
Education (medium short) .582 .493 0 1
Education (medium long) .149 .356 0 1
Education (long) .065 .246 0 1
Founder incomet 1 12.025 1.552 0 15.340
1
st generation immigrants .061 .239 0 1
2
nd generation immigrants .005 .072 0 1
Industry tenure (broad) 1.182 1.067 0 3.091
Tenure at previous employer 4.098 4.386 0 21
Ln (previous employer size) 3.039 1.564 .693 8.922
Ln (previous employer age) 2.211 .664 .693 2.773
Previous employer age > 15 years .420 .494 0 1
Spin-o (narrow) .376 .484 0 1
Ln (number of rms in industry) .322 .346 0 .693
Ln (managerial tenure) .494 .906 0 3.091
Model 1 presents our baseline model with just the controls as predictors. Most of the predictors
have signicant impacts on the hazard of exit with age, initial size, limited liability and education
as the strongest predictors. We add industry tenure and a dummy for intra-industry spin-os to
Model 2. Both are strong predictors. The hazard of exit are signicantly lower for rms founded
by previous employees of incumbent rms (employed in the industry directly prior to founding the
rm) in the same 4-digit industry and/or by founders with experience in the 2-digit industry.
We introduce a number of variables to Model 3. Most importantly, we add tenure at the previous
employer. We also add some parent specic controls, age and size. We conrm our theory as tenure
from the previous employer have a signicant and negative impact on the hazard of exit, even after
controlling for age and size of the previous employer. This indicates a clear advantage for longer
employment spells prior to entry. Model 4 includes an interaction eect between intra-industry
spin-os and tenure at previous employer. This will show a separate of tenure for spin-os and
non-spin-os. We nd that spin-os with tenure have even lower hazards of exit, but the main eect
remains signicant, which shows that even non-spin-os enjoy longer tenure at previous employer.
In Model 5, we add an additional interaction eect between intra-industry spin-o and size of
previous employer. This will tell whether we separate eects of previous employer size on spin-os
and non-spin-os. We nd that intra-industry spin-os have signicantly lower hazards of exit with
declining previous employer size than the average eect. This shows that spin-os of small rmsDahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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Table 2 Logit regressions (rm-year observations)
Variable Model1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Age (1 year) 17.680
 17.671
 17.669
 17.667
 17.667
 17.667
 17.667

(0.185) (0.188) (0.199) (0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.201)
Age (2 years) 17.621
 17.629
 17.631
 17.629
 17.629
 17.629
 17.629

(0.187) (0.189) (0.200) (0.201) (0.202) (0.203) (0.202)
Age (3-4 years) 17.394
 17.418
 17.424
 17.421
 17.423
 17.422
 17.422

(0.187) (0.189) (0.200) (0.201) (0.203) (0.203) (0.202)
Age (5-9 years) 17.158
 17.205
 17.215
 17.214
 17.215
 17.215
 17.215

(0.189) (0.192) (0.203) (0.204) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205)
Ln (initial size) -0.241
 -0.221
 -0.224
 -0.223
 -0.228
 -0.228
 -0.228

(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Limited liability -0.355
 -0.384
 -0.389
 -0.388
 -0.394
 -0.395
 -0.404

(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Male -0.119
 -0.030 -0.014 -0.017 -0.020 -0.019 -0.027
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Labor market experiences (years) -0.051
 -0.037
 -0.031
 -0.031
 -0.031
 -0.031
 -0.031

(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Labor market experiences (years)
2 0.001
 0.001
 0.001
 0.001
 0.001
 0.001
 0.001

(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (medium short) -0.264
 -0.224
 -0.222
 -0.222
 -0.223
 -0.223
 -0.223

(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Education (medium long) -0.279
 -0.309
 -0.316
 -0.315
 -0.315
 -0.315
 -0.337

(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061)
Education (long) -0.321
 -0.313
 -0.331
 -0.329
 -0.327
 -0.327
 -0.384

(0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.089)
Founder incomet 1 -0.030
 -0.026
 -0.026
 -0.026
 -0.027
 -0.027
 -0.027

(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
1
st generation immigrants 0.084 0.067 0.063 0.062 0.067 0.068 0.070
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
2
nd generation immigrants 0.242 0.190 0.201 0.203 0.205 0.205 0.195
(0.191) (0.197) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188)
Industry tenure (broad) -0.194
 -0.179
 -0.168
 -0.173
 -0.169
 -0.170

(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Tenure at previous employer -0.025
 -0.020
 -0.019
 -0.019
 -0.019

(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln (previous employer size) 0.059
 0.058
 0.044
 0.044
 0.044

(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln (previous employer age) -0.072
y -0.068
y -0.075
y -0.076
y -0.075
y
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Previous employer age > 15 years -0.014 -0.014 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Spin-o (narrow) -0.298
 -0.245
 -0.189
 -0.431
 -0.423
 -0.418

(0.044) (0.046) (0.054) (0.093) (0.097) (0.097)
x tenure at previous employer -0.020
 -0.021
 -0.020
 -0.020

(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
x ln (previous employer size) 0.100
 0.100
 0.098

(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Ln (number of rms in industry) -0.023 -0.022
(0.088) (0.088)
Ln (managerial tenure) 0.044
y
(0.025)
Constant -17.695 -17.543 -17.609 -17.642 -17.579 -17.578 -17.558
Industry eects (7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor market region eects (33) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Log likelihood -12,156 -12,012 -11,980 -11,977 -11,972 -11,972 -11,971
Firm-year cases 38,059 38,059 38,059 38,059 38,059 3,8059 38,059
Number of rms 7,968 7,968 7,968 7,968 7,968 7,968 7,968
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%Dahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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are more likely to survive over time.
Our ndings in Table 2 conrmed our hypothesis concerning the negative eect of tenure on the
hazard of exit for spin-os. We argue that the longer employment spell at the previous employers
leads to more and better accumulation of knowledge, which ultimately is advantageous, when
founders leave to start their own business in the same industry. This advantage leads to better
probabilities of survival according to our theory.
However, we could also see other eects behind this nding. Our theory is a human capital
story, where longer tenure is an accumulation of human capital based on knowledge about the
organization of the previous employer and the industry in which it resides. What we are nding
could also be interpreted as a social capital story, where the founder builds social relationships
in and outside the previous employer during long spells of employment. Earlier studies of social
networks have found that mobility typically expands social networks. Thus if it is a social capital
story rather than a human capital story, more mobile founders should have greater networks, which
should lower the hazard of exit.
Another theoretical argument would be that founders might just as well accumulate human
capital from employment in several rms in the same industry and not just one. This would be
captured by our measure for industry tenure, but we add another variable, the log of the number of
rms in the industry in which the founder have been employed, to test this and the social capital
story in Model 6. This measure is insignicant. There is no eect on the hazard of exit, if the
founder have been employed in multiple rms in the industry. We still cannot completely rule out
that the eects of tenure at previous employer is social capital, but it seems peculiar that these
would be specic to the employment in one single organization.
Tenure is by denition long-term employment at one organization. In some cases, long-term
employment could lead to promotions within this rm. Therefore, founders with longer tenure
could be higher ranked in the previous organization, which could an alternative explanation behind
our ndings. To control for this, we add the log number of years of managerial experience that the
founder has. This cannot be the explanation for our ndings, since this measure has a modestly
signicant positive eect on the hazard of exit (and is uncorrelated with tenure at the previous
employer).
Another more serious threat to our ndings could be that founders with longer employment
spells at past employers become more and more accommodated with the past employer as time
goes by. The fact that they have been there for a long time indicated that they have a good t with
that organization. The likelihood of them leaving the rm might be inuenced by this development.Dahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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If this is true, our results could be explained by the argument that founders are more reluctant to
leave the longer they have stayed there. They simply have higher opportunity cost of leaving. As
a consequence, it will require a relatively better idea or opportunity for them to leave. This would
lead to endogeneity in our results, because there is selection in who becomes entrepreneurs.
5. Discussion.
Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests that spin-os are in some way mirror images of
their parent rms in terms of their organizational routines. Organizational routines are transferred
from the parent rm to the start-up through the founders of the new rm. Founders adapt and
improve on the organizational routines of their parent rms. These routines involve both codied
and tacit knowledge, which are accumulated during employment in the parent rm. It has been
argued in the literature that this signicantly improves the survival probabilities of the spin-os
compared to other start-ups. We argue that the degree of absorption of the organizational routines
will be shaped by the duration of founders employment in the parent rm. These start-ups will
simply have a superior initial knowledge endowment, because their founders have had the oppor-
tunity to accumulate more knowledge at the parent rm during a longer period of employment.
This will enable them to perform better, because they are better able to adapt and improve the
routines, since their knowledge about them is presumably greater. Shorter tenured founders might
have to rely more completely on the parent rms routines, because they do not have the amount
of knowledge needed to suciently adapt the routines.
Experience within the industry has a greater eect on survival than tenure, but we emphasize
that knowledge from a specic parent rm has a signicant impact. This indicates quite strongly
that the knowledge that founders pick up from specic parent rms has a positive impact on their
start-ups the longer they were employed in that organization. These ndings support the general
argument that the survival chances of new organizations are positively inuenced by the knowledge
endowment of their founders. Knowledge and experience from within the same industry will make
spin-os more successful from the outset, because their organizational routines and accumulated
knowledge will be better shaped for success.
It is important to take founders histories into account when studying spin-os and to understand
that these organizations are rather heterogeneous. We found evidence that tenure signicantly
increases the probability that a spin-o survives. The theory is that the longer a person is employed
at the parent rm before the spin-o occurs, the more likely the spin-o will be inuenced by the
organizational routines of the parent rm. Inherited eects are stronger, the longer the foundersDahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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were employed there. A stronger inherited eect on the organizational routines should consequently
lead to a greater likelihood of survival, because the founders are better endowed to adapt, improve
and reect on the knowledge gained in the parent rm. The tenure eect shows that parent rms
have an important impact on the survival of spin-os. The fact that tenure is signicant and
positive in this respect supports the assumption that parent-specic knowledge is the explanation
for the increased probability of survival.
If the founders were employed a relatively longer time at the parent rm, this positively inuences
the chances of survival of spin-os, because they have a much stronger heritage. The founders
are able to both replicate and modify the organizational routines of the parent rms to a much
higher extent, because of their relatively longer employment which is likely to increase the degree
of absorption and accumulation of knowledge. This clearly demonstrates that it is the source of
experience and the type of start-up that is at the centre of survival, and subsequent long-term
economic growth.
6. Conclusions.
Many countries and governments focus strongly on entrepreneurship and increased rm founding
to promote economic growth but often will little account being taken of our nding that the
background of the start-ups has clear and signicant eects on life chances. It would perhaps
be more rational for policy makers to focus on specic types of start-up rather than simply to
encourage increased numbers.
The ndings from our study have some important implications for policy. We nd that the
strongest entrepreneurs are those that have pre-entry experience and have been employed in an
incumbent organization in the industry. This implies that it would be of value to encourage this
type of entry. In this respect, it is critical to address the possible negative impact of non-compete
covenants on this specic type of entry. Non-compete covenants are a component of employment
contracts, which prevent the employees from starting up new rms in the same industry in the
future. Incumbent rms include such classes in their employment contract in an eort to protect
rm specic knowledge from being diused to other rms. While this may or may not achieve
their aims, it may critically hinder potential entrepreneurs from starting own ventures in the
industry. This means that the pool of entrepreneurs that have been successful, has been reduced
from a societal point of view. Prohibiting rms from including these covenants in their employment
contracts could increase entry of new successful rms, thereby beneting the overall economy.
Organizations founded by individuals from within the industry have relatively higher chances of
survival. This result clearly directs attention towards the possible negative eect of non-competeDahl and Reichstein: Heritage of Employee Startups
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covenants in employees contracts. If spin-os are more likely to survive, they will also be socially
benecial and provide the economy with valuable input as promoters of growth. In this respect, it
would probably be of benet to the economy if rms could be dissuaded from imposing conditions
that prevent former employees from starting up businesses within the same industry. In fact,
legislators may want to reduce the stigma often associated with employees who leave companies to
start their own rms.
The ndings from this study imply that organizational knowledge carried to spin-os from parent
rms has a signicant impact on the performance of new organizations. Spin-os seem to be based
on a stronger knowledge endowment, which positively increases their chances of survival.
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